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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Professional sports have become a national obsession1 and the sports 
entertainment industry has flourished into big business in the United States.2  
Superstar athletes demand salaries of over $100 million3 and, as a result, have 
reached celebrity status.4  This status brings with it the public’s demand for 
performance at the highest level and the physical sacrifice associated with a win-at-
all-costs attitude.5  Sports reports and game summaries are incomplete without 
coverage of an injured athlete forfeiting his body for the team and his fans, or 
overcoming some painful injury for the love of the game.6  
Injuries are a substantial part of any professional sport and require treatment from 
qualified personnel.  Most professional sports teams are contractually bound to 
                                                                
1Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 HOUS. L. 
REV. 657, 657 (1981) (Stating that sports, athletics, and physical fitness have grown into a 
national obsession); see also, James H. Davis, “Fixing” the Standard of Care: Motivated 
Athletes and Medical Practice, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215, 220 (1998) (stating that athletes 
are an essential part of modern social culture). 
2See generally, ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, 2 LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE 
SPORTS INDUSTRIES 14 (2d ed. 1993). 
3In December 2000, free-agent shortstop, Alex Rodriguez signed a guaranteed Major 
League Baseball contract with the Texas Rangers for $252 million.  See Tom Verducci, 
Powerball: Alex Rodriguez Hit the Jackpot When the Rangers Offered Him $252 Million and 
the City of Texas, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 2000, at 102.  Shortstop Derek Jeter recently 
signed a ten-year, $189 million contract with the New York Yankees.  See Anthony 
McCarron, Jeter’s Jillions Put Yanks on Defensive Champs but Not in Payroll, DAILY NEWS 
(New York), Feb. 10, 2001, at 51.  Los Angeles Lakers star, Shaquille O’neal is currently 
playing out a seven-year contract worth $120 million.  See Rachel Blount,  Shaquille O’neal’s 
Impending Debut With the Los Angeles Lakers - at a Cost of$120 Million – is Sending Shock 
Waves Through an NBA City Starved for a Superstar, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Sept. 29, 
1996, at 4C.  
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provide their athletes with medical care.  Many teams employ the services of medical 
doctors in order to fulfill this requirement.7  The relationship between the team 
physician and the professional athlete [hereinafter athlete] differs from the typical 
doctor-patient relationship, and can result in less than competent treatment wherein 
the athlete’s best interests are sacrificed.8 
Team management, the coaching staff, the public, and the players themselves all 
demand a winning team.  In pursuing the ultimate goal of a championship, athletes 
undoubtedly compromise their health for the good of the team.  Pressures on the 
athlete to play while injured or on a team physician to withhold medical information 
from an athlete are constantly present.  As a result, athletes frequently play through 
pain and injury.  All too often, athletes compete without full knowledge of the 
associated risks of permanent physical disability.9 
Examples of athletes succumbing to the pressures exerted on them are abundant.  
Mike Robitaille, a professional hockey player in the National Hockey League (NHL) 
was sidelined with a shoulder injury and threatened with suspension if he didn’t 
begin playing.10  His coach, Phillip Maloney commented: 
Of course we [Robitaille’s team, the Vancouver Canucks] were short a 
defenceman with Robitaille out (sore shoulder).  I don’t know exactly 
how bad it is but I tell you he’d better start playing.  If he doesn’t, I’m 
going to have to consider suspending him.  I’ll have a talk with him about 
it.11 
At the demand of his coach and the advice of team physicians and the team trainer, 
Robitaille suffered severe injuries and endured excruciating pain in order to continue 
to play hockey and maintain his employment.12  The injuries Robitaille experienced 
ultimately ended his professional hockey career and left him permanently disabled.13  
Robitaille eventually recovered against his club through a negligence claim for 
failing to act reasonably to ensure his fitness, health, and safety.14 
Similarly, basketball great, Bill Walton, was plagued with injuries throughout 
much of his career, but conceded to pressure to continue playing.15  In order to play 
through pain, Walton reluctantly accepted injections and other pain numbing 
                                                                
7See generally, GARY A. UBERSTINE, 2 LAW OF PROFESSIONAL & AMATEUR SPORTS 14 A 
24-25 (2000).  See also infra note 41. 
8See generally, id. at 14 A 2-3. 
9See infra, note 12, 15, 18. 
10Robitaille v.Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd., 124 D.L. R. (3d) 228, 230 (1981). 
11Id. 
12See generally id. 
13Id. 
14Id. at 233. 
15Twila Keim, Physicians for Professional Sports Teams: Health Care Under the Pressure 
of Economic and Commercial Interests, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 196, 219 (1999), citing 
Joseph Nocera, Bitter Medicine, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1995. 
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medication for several years.16  Walton eventually settled a lawsuit against his former 
team, the Portland Trailblaizers.  However, he currently suffers from permanent 
injuries as a result of receiving numerous Novicaine and cortisone injections during 
his short professional career.17   
Former National Football League (NFL) standouts, Charles Krueger and Dick 
Butkus sued their respective teams, alleging that the team and team physicians failed 
to disclose the nature and extent of their injuries and failed to inform them of the 
risks associated with painkilling treatments.18  More and more professional athletes 
are seeking redress for alleged mistreatment by professional sports franchises, and 
the medical doctors they employ, through the legal system.19  The major professional 
leagues20 and professional sports teams have responded by creating a system in 
which both teams and team physicians escape personal liability.21 
This note discusses the role of the team physician and the unique conflicts he or 
she faces when providing medical care to athletes.  In particular, the note describes 
the pressure team doctors experience from team management, the coaching staff, and 
the players themselves.22  Next, the note discusses the types of claims professional 
athletes have brought against their doctors and team employers and how the terms of 
collective bargaining agreements (CBA) and workers’ compensation laws create 
obstacles to their recovery.  The note will explore the need for a specialized legal 
standard within the practice of sports medicine and identify the disincentive for 
sports physicians to act professionally in the absence of a heightened standard of 
care.  The final section of the note offers solutions to address the conflicts team 
physicians face.  Recommendations include establishing a more definite and 
predictable legal standard of care for application to sports medicine practitioners, 
creating an alternative application of state workers’ compensation laws to the 
professional sports workplace, and amending the CBAs currently governing major 
professional sports.  
                                                                
16Id.  
17Id. 
18See Kruger v. San Francisco Forty Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).  See 
also BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 510. 
19See e.g., Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579; Robitalle, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 228; Martin v. 
Casagrande, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1990); DePiano v. Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 
F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 
20The major professional sports leagues in America are the National Hockey League 
(NHL), the National Football League (NFL), the National Basketball Association (NBA), and 
Major League Baseball (MLB).  See generally Kenneth Shouler, After the Fall, CIGAR 
AFICIONADO (2001). 
21See generally, WEISTART & LOWELL, infra note 29. 
22See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 3. 
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II.  TEAM PHYSICIANS 
A.  Team Physician Defined 
Currently no uniform definition of a team physician exists because of the varied 
practitioners in the field, and the multitude of diverse relationships physicians may 
have with teams.23  For the purposes of this note, however, a team physician is 
defined as any doctor who performs professional medical services to athletes that are 
either arranged for or paid for, at least in part, by an institution or entity other than 
the athlete or his or her insurance company.24  This doctor-athlete relationship 
represents a departure from the typical doctor-patient relationship because the person 
receiving the treatment is distinct from the person or entity paying for the services.25   
B.  Physician’s Contractual Responsibilities and Legal Duties 
A team physician’s duties are usually well defined in an employment contract 
with the professional franchise.26  A typical professional team physician may be 
responsible for any or all of the following in the course of his or her employment: 
diagnosis and treatment of injuries, arranging for or performing surgical procedures, 
regulating physical fitness regiments and dietary plans, referrals to specialists, 
designing and overseeing rehabilitation programs, and making medical clearance 
decisions.27 
In addition to the duties created by a physician’s employment agreement, team 
doctors owe legal duties to the athletes they treat.  The typical doctor-patient 
situation is a consensual relationship between physician and patient.28  The doctor 
has fiduciary obligations toward his or her patient.29  Although the doctor-athlete 
relationship is distinguishable, it is generally accepted that a team physician owes an 
athlete the same fiduciary duties,30 at least in situations where the doctor is rendering 
                                                                
23See King, supra note 1, at 658. 
24Id. 
25Id.  
26See UBERSTINE, supra note 2, at 14 A 24.  See also Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968 
P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (where a professional team physician signed an employment 
contract specifically identifying his duties and responsibilities to the team.).  
27See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 3. 
28See generally id. at ch.14 A. 
29JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 988 (1979) citing 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914). 
30The nature of these fiduciary duties center on the notion that the doctor is to provide 
treatment governed by the patient’s best interests.  Id.  at 990. 
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therapeutic treatment directly to the athlete.31  The doctor’s fiduciary relationship 
with a patient-athlete is governed and evaluated by general tort law principles.32 
A physician owes his or her patient a duty of competent treatment dictated by the 
patient’s best interests, and a duty to not expose a patient to any unreasonable risk of 
harm.33 The standard of care applicable to a general practitioner of medicine is 
measured according to the common skill and competence of a member of the 
medical profession in good standing.34  Furthermore, when a professional holds him 
or herself out as a specialist, the applicable standard is the reasonable conduct of a 
member of that particular specialty.35  Although these principles are well-defined and 
accepted throughout the modern legal system, their application to sports medicine 
practitioners has resulted in a less than clear standard.36  Some courts have been 
reluctant to impose a higher standard to sports medicine specialists37 because there 
are no established standards for qualification as a sports medicine practitioner.38  
Currently, the American Medical Association (AMA) does not recognize sports 
medicine as a sub-specialty.39   
Many malpractice lawsuits against team physicians settle out of court before 
reaching final adjudication.40   Thus, there are relatively few cases delineating the 
legal standard by which a team physician is evaluated.  One court has recognized a 
higher duty applicable to the practice of sports medicine.41  However, this case seems 
to be an exception.  The legal system’s concern with uniformity of legal standards,42 
and the lack of recognition of sports medicine as a specialty by the AMA has 
                                                                
31Id. at 991, citing Hoffman v. Rogers, 99 Cal. Rptr. 455 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (stating that 
a doctor-patient relationship exists between employer and doctor hired by employer giving rise 
to fiduciary obligations). 
32See King, supra note 1, at 663-65 (stating that regardless who hires a team physician, 
there exists a duty to an examinee or patient athlete not to inflict injury by misfeasance and 
that a broad duty to act with due care exists once a doctor begins to render aid).  See generally 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) [Hereinafter RESTATEMENT 2d]. 
33See Matthew J. Mitten, Annotation, Medical Malpractice Liability of Sports Medicine 
Care Providers for Injury to, or Death of, Athlete, 33 A.L.R. 5th 619 (1999). 
34See Keim, supra note 15, at 200.  See also RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 32, at § 282 
(defining negligence as unreasonable conduct exposing others to unreasonable risk of harm). 
35The requisite standard of care applicable to members of a specialty is the skill and 
competence of a member of that particular trade or specialty in good standing.  RESTATEMENT 
2d, supra note 30, at § 299 A. 
36Id. 
37See Rosensweig v. State, 158 N.E.2d 229, 237 (N.Y. 1959) (scrutinizing a ringside 
doctor’s conduct in examining and clearing a boxer to fight pursuant to a standard of care 
imposed on a general medical practitioner). 
38See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 4. 
39Id. 
40See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 510 n.12-14. 
41See generally Fleischmann v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 216 (La. Ct. App. 1985). 
42See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 510 n.12-14.  
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resulted in uncertainty with respect to the standard of care applicable to physicians 
practicing sports medicine.  It is unclear whether a team physician, providing 
medical care as a practitioner of sports medicine, is held to a higher standard than 
that of a general practitioner.  This ambiguity inhibits the imposition of incentives 
for physicians, holding themselves out as sports medicine specialists, to administer 
treatment in accord with an elevated standard of care associated with professional 
sub-specialties. 
Despite the lack of recognition by the AMA, sports medicine as a specialty is 
gaining acceptance throughout the medical community.  For example, the American 
Osteopathic Association offers certification for physicians practicing or 
contemplating the practice of sports medicine.43  Prior to 1970, there were few 
medical publications concerning sports medicine.  Today, that number has increased 
dramatically.44  The Professional Team Physicians Organization, of whom over 
eighty percent are professional team physicians, provides descriptions of injuries and 
their prevention online.45  The study of sports medicine continues to produce data 
compilations as the area of practice grows.46 
C.  Conflicts Facing Team Physicians Compromise Independence  
of Medical Judgment 
The role of a team physician differs from ordinary physicians treating private 
patients.  Normally, the doctor is a considered team employee and receives 
compensation from the team itself as opposed to receiving payment from the patient 
or the patient’s insurance company.  Numerous conflicts of interests arise from this 
arrangement.  A team physician must constantly decide whose interests to serve: the 
athlete as his or her patient, or the team as his or her employer.47  The team physician 
has two masters to serve in executing his or her professional judgment.48  The 
                                                                
43Id.  Moreover, a doctor certified by the American Board of Emergency Medicine, 
Internal Medicine, Family practice, or Pediatrics may earn a Certificate of Added 
Qualification in sports medicine by passing a written exam or by serving a one-year fellowship 
offered by various clinics; see also Charles V. Russell, Legal and Ethical Conflicts Arising 
From Team Physician’s Dual Obligations to the Athlete and Management, 10 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 299, 299 n.2 (1987) (stating that there are currently over 400 sports medicine clinics 
in operation in the United States); See also Sigmund J. Solares, Preventing Medical 
Malpractice of Team Physicians in Professional Sports: A Call for the Players Unions to Hire 
the Team Physicians in Professional Sports, 4 SPORTS LAW. J. 235, 238 (1997) (stating that 
there are approximately 3,800 medical doctors in the American College of Sports Medicine). 
44See Russell, supra note 43, at 300 (recognizing the following resources: AM. J. SP. MED., 
J. SP. MED & PHYSICAL FITNESS, PHYSICIAN’S SP. MED. SCIENCE & SP., and MED. SCIENCE SP. 
& EXERCISE). 
45See Shouler, supra note 20, at 85 (stating that physicians from the Professional Team 
Physicians Organization made up of physicians from the NHL, NFL, NBA, MLB, and 
Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) maintain a web site at 
http://www.sportcare.com).  
46See supra text accompanying note 43, at 300. 
47See Davis, supra note 1, at 223. 
48See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 505. 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
514 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:507 
interests of the team management, the athlete, the coach, and the doctor may all 
conflict in ways that can physically harm athletes. 
1.  Pressures from Team Management/Employer 
Team management controls the team physician’s employment and exerts pressure 
on the doctor.  This pressure may ultimately compromise his or her medical 
judgment and compel him or her to sacrifice the best interests of athletes.49  For 
example, team management may pressure a physician to clear an athlete for 
competition before he is physically ready, conceal the true extent of an athlete’s 
condition or injury,50 or prescribe a “quick fix” in derogation of reasonable medical 
practices.51  Obviously, these decisions may compromise the long-term health of the 
professional athlete.   
Sports entertainment is a business like any other, and management is responsible 
for making its franchise profitable.  Increasing ticket sales, acquiring television 
coverage, and selling team merchandise accomplish this goal.  The most effective 
way to increase profitability is by winning games, and ultimately, a championship.  
In order to win games, a team must field its best players, and the need to maximize 
the immediate potential of athletes is paramount.  Accordingly, team management 
may be willing to jeopardize the health of its players in order to realize immediate 
financial success.52  Former Los Angeles Raider Lester Hayes said,  
The team doctors are trying to tell me that all of this is in my head.  That’s 
the way they operate in the NFL when a guy gets injured.  It’s a powerful 
psychological stimuli.  I’ve seen guys who are so hurt that they can barely 
move, but the team doctors try to browbeat them with good feelings.  I 
call it Psychological B.S. 101.  They tell you, “Everything’s fine.  You’re 
much better.  Nothing’s wrong with you.”  They get you so psyched up 
that you’ll play, even though you shouldn’t be out there.  It happens all 
the time.53 
It is evident that some professional athletes mistrust team doctors with mistrust 
because they feel that the physicians are accountable to management and not the 
athletes.  A professional team management’s control over the team physician’s 
employment subjects him or her to pressure which may operate to compromise his or 
her medical judgment. 
2.  Pressures from Coaching Staff  
Professional coaches may influence team physicians to compromise an athlete’s 
health in an effort to win games.  A professional coach’s success ultimately depends 
upon his or her winning percentage, or team management’s assessment of his or her 
                                                                
49See King, supra note 1, at 698; see also Solares, supra note 43, at 140. 
50See generally Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 579. 
51See generally Davis, supra note 1. 
52Id. at 230. 
53Teresa Herbert, Are Player Injuries Adequately Compensated?,  7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243, 
244-45 (2000); Jay Lawrence, “Truth Teller”, Hayes Banished, SPORTING NEWS, Oct. 26, 
1987, at 31. 
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potential to lead a team to success.  As a result, coaches may pressure a team 
physician with respect to his or her autonomous decisions regarding diagnosis and 
appropriate medical treatment.54  Firing coaches for failing to meet employer 
expectations is commonplace in the world of athletics.  Coach’s face tremendous 
pressure to win, even at the expense of athletes’ long-term health.  Phillip Maloney, 
the coach of the Vancouver Canucks, obviously felt pressure to win when he 
suspended Mike Robitaille and denied him pay for nonparticipation as a result of an 
injury.55  Coaches need to produce the best team available from the players on his or 
her roster.  The overbearing control a coach possesses over a professional team 
affords him or her the power to bench players, impose fines and suspensions, 
threaten termination, and influence team personnel.  Ultimately, however, it is the 
team physician’s responsibility to protect athletes from pressures to play through 
pain and injury.  
A coach’s financial and professional success ultimately depends on players’ 
present performance.  Therefore, a coach may pressure a team physician to 
compromise sound medical judgment or accepted practices so that an athlete will be 
available for competition.56  As a member of the team staff, a team physician may be 
subject to the influences of the coach, the leader of the team under which the doctor 
is employed, and forsake his or her professional judgment. 
3.  Pressures from Professional Athletes 
Professional athletes, unlike ordinary patients, pressure physicians to make 
decisions which may not be in the athletes’ best long-term health interests in order to 
pursue their livelihood.  The combined average career of athletes in the NFL, NHL, 
and the National Basketball Association (NBA) is a short 4.3 years,57 and a thirty two 
year old professional baseball player is considered a seasoned veteran in the latter 
stages of his career.58  Meanwhile, the potential for making millions is increasingly 
present in the professional sports industry and the competition among amateurs to 
reach the big leagues is fierce.  The minimum salary for a NBA player is $316,969, 
and jumps to a minimum of $1,000,000 for a ten-year veteran.59  The average NHL 
player earns $1,365,000 per year.60  Although the average and minimum salaries of 
professional athletes are substantial, they are miniscule in comparison to superstar 
athletes who command deals in the 100 million-dollar range.61  Professional athletes 
achieve superstar status by performing at the highest levels and recording statistics 
that top the charts in their respective sports.   
                                                                
54See Davis, supra note 1, at 219. 
55Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 232. 
56See Davis, supra note 1, at 219. 
57See Shouler, supra note 20, at 4-11. 
58See Davis, supra note 1, at 217.  
59See Shouler, supra note 20, at 82. 
60Id. at 84. 
61See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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Experienced professional athletes are always fighting off younger players who 
want to replace them.62  Thus, they are not inclined to sit out a game and allow 
another player an opportunity.  Sports trivia buffs will remember that Wally Pipp, 
former starter for the New York Yankees sat out one game because of a headache 
only to witness Lou Gherig start the next 2,130 consecutive games.63  More recently, 
Trent Green, the former starting quarterback for the Saint Louis Rams of the NFL, 
was injured and sat out the rest of the season while his back-up, Kurt Warner, went 
on to win Superbowl XXXIV, league MVP, Superbowl MVP, a long-term contract, 
and ultimately Green’s starting position.64   
Professional athletes realize their time is limited to attain superstar status and do 
not want to limit their playing time, and potential chances for fame and fortune by 
nursing injuries on the sidelines.65  As a result, professional athletes themselves 
pressure team physicians by attempting to convince doctors that they are physically 
capable to compete. 
When players insist that they are able to compete and physicians know otherwise, 
team doctors should not certify them eligible to play.  One commentator has 
suggested that athletes should not be permitted to decide on their own whether to 
participate in at least three situations:66 (1) where there are significant risks of severe 
harm; (2) where the lucidity of the athlete is in question or his decision making 
ability is clouded, for example, a decision made in the heat of battle,  (3) and where 
the decision to return the athlete to competition would be incompatible with a 
broadly-defined standard of professional practice.67  Currently there are no uniform 
guidelines directing decisions regarding medical clearance to return to a particular 
athletic competition.68 
4.  Self-Imposed Pressures 
A less obvious conflict facing team physicians is self-imposed.  A team 
physician’s role on a professional sports team is important, and in many situations 
team doctors are regarded as contributing members of the team.69  As members of the 
team, physicians are influenced by a desire to win that may interfere with their 
                                                                
62See generally Davis, supra note 1, at 217-20. 
63Id. at 217-18. 
64See George Vecsey, Sports of the Times; Kurt Warner Gives Hope to Others, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at 1D. 
65See Davis, supra note 1, at 218.  
66See generally King, supra note 1. 
67Id. 
68See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 12-13 (stating that although no uniform standards 
exist, physicians should consider the intensity and physical demands of the sport the individual 
athlete’s unique physiology whether the athlete has previously participated in the sport with 
the conditions the available clinical evidence medical organization or league guidelines the 
probability and severity of harm and whether any medication, monitoring, or protective 
equipment would minimize potential health risks and enable safe participation). 
69Scott Polsky, Winning Medicine: Professional Sports Team Doctors’ Conflicts of 
Interest, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 503, 517-20 (1998).  
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medical judgment.70  Athletes arguably pay the cost.  This potential conflict may also 
arise when team physicians participate in bonus systems based on the team’s record 
or performance, or when they receive championship rings.   
The most obvious self-imposed pressure is the desire of the physician to retain 
his status as a professional team doctor.  Many perks and benefits accompany the 
attendant publicity.71  Many team physicians maintain local private practices that 
benefit from the exposure of being a professional team’s physician.72  In fact, 
recently, NFL teams have invited bids from physicians to compete for the position.  
The franchise will offer the position to the physician or organization who will pay 
the most, or who will provide the cheapest medical treatment.73  This bidding to treat 
athletes reflects the value a physician places on being associated with a professional 
sports team.74  Arguably, medical positions awarded to the highest bidder may 
compromise the interests of the athletes.75 
III.  TORT CLAIMS BROUGHT AGAINST PROFESSIONAL TEAMS AND TEAM PHYSICIANS 
A.  Negligence Claims Against Professional Teams 
Collective bargaining agreements governing the major professional sports 
leagues in the United States require teams to provide medical care to their athletes.76  
Most standard player contracts contain clauses reflecting this duty.77  Accordingly, 
professional teams have a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure the safety, 
fitness, and health of their players.78  A team may be subject to a negligence or a 
breach of contract action for violating these terms.79 
Mike Robitaille successfully sued the Vancouver Canucks of the NHL for breach 
of contract based on the team’s mistreatment of his injuries.80  Robitaille sustained 




73Being a professional team doctor makes sense economically because of the amount of 
visibility in the community associated with the position.  Recently, some physicians have 
actually paid professional sports teams up to $1 million for the rights to provide medical 
treatment to their athletes.  See id. (citing Joseph Nocera, Bitter Medicine, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1995, at 82); see also Keim, supra note 15, at 215-18. 
74See Keim, supra note 15, at 216. 
75Id.  Contracts awarded to the physician who will provide the cheapest medical care (pay 
the most for procurement of the employment agreement) do not seem to indicate a situation 
where the best interest of the athletes are paramount.  In these scenarios, the physician’s 
primary commitment appears to be to financial prosperity through association with the 
franchise, rather than to the health of his or her patient-athletes. 
76UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 24-28. 
77See Herbert, supra note 53, at 246-47.  
78See generally, Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 228. 
79Id. 
80Id.  at 233. 
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injuries during an away game.  He described to the team trainer that he felt “rubbery” 
and “shocking” sensations in his right leg.81  The Canuck’s trainer told doctors from 
the home team that Robitaille’s problems were more mental than physical.82  Soon 
thereafter, Robitaille was involved in a collision with another player during a game, 
after which his right leg jerked uncontrollably and he had to be carried off the ice.83  
Robitaille repeatedly asked the team trainer to see a doctor but was never given any 
significant medical attention.84  A week later, Robitaille was body checked on the ice 
and injured his spinal cord.85  Immediately following the injury, Canuck’s doctors 
told Robitaille to go home and take a couple of shots of Courvoisier cognac.86  An 
independent doctor subsequently diagnosed Robitaille with a permanent disability.87   
The court in Robitaille ultimately held that the Canucks had breached Robitaille’s 
player contract by failing to provide adequate health care, despite having actual 
notice of his injuries and their potential severity.88 
Although Robitaille sued his team directly, most claims brought by athletes focus 
on the conduct of the team physician.89  However, professional sports franchises may 
be held liable for the acts of employee doctors.90  These suits are based on the theory 
of respondeat superior whereby employers are liable for the negligent acts of their 
employees.  For example, Charles Krueger recovered against the San Francisco 
Forty-Niners when the team physician fraudulently withheld medical information 
from him.91  Krueger successfully argued that the Forty-Niners maintained sufficient 
control over the team physician as an employee, for the team itself to be liable based 
on the principle of respondeat superior.92 
B.  Claims Against Team Physicians 
1.  Medical Malpractice Claims 
The majority of claims against team physicians have been brought as negligence 
claims alleging medical malpractice93 based on a team physician’s failure to discover 
                                                                
81Id. at 231. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
84Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 231-32. 
85Id. at 232. 
86Id. 
87Id. at 232. 
88Id. at 233-34. 
89See e.g., Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84; Hendy v. Losse, 819 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1991); 
Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Appr. 1978); 
Sherwin v. Indianappolis Colts, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
90See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 265 (2002). 
91See Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579, 583-84. 
92Id.  
93See Mitten, supra note 33, at § 2(a). 
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an abnormality during a physical examination, improper medical clearance, improper 
medical care, or failure to disclose the nature and extent of an injury.94  The 
reasonableness of the medical care provided, put at issue in these claims, is measured 
according to common tort law negligence principles.95  Regardless of the exact 
standard used to evaluate a team doctor’s conduct, decisions are made on a case-by-
case basis—ultimately determining whether the physician deviated from reasonable 
conduct under the circumstances and exposed the athlete to an unreasonable risk of 
harm.96 
2.  Nondisclosure/Fraudulent Concealment/Misrepresentation Claims 
All physicians have a duty to disclose any material information that would 
reasonably affect a patient’s decisions regarding treatment of his or her injuries.97  If a 
doctor fails to obtain a patient’s informed consent, he or she may be subject to 
liability.  Informed consent is based on the premise of individual autonomy.  A 
human being of legal capacity and majority should be able to make decisions 
regarding his or her own body.98  The recent trend however, is to require the 
disclosure that a reasonable patient needs to make an informed decision.99 
A physician’s duty of full disclosure is particularly important within the context 
of the professional sports industry.  Most professional athletes are accustomed to 
playing with pain,100 and generally seek out the quickest rehabilitative options.101  If a 
team physician does not fully inform an athlete of the potential dangers associated 
with playing with a particular injury, or of the risks of a proposed treatment, the 
athlete’s decision is uninformed.  Under these circumstances, treatment may be 
considered administered without authority as a result of the physician’s breach of his 
or her duty of disclosure.102  Ultimately, the lack of informed consent, or treatment 
administered in the absence of consent, reduces to actionable negligence against the 
care provider. 
When team doctors intentionally withhold material information regarding the true 
extent or nature of an injury, the risks associated with a particular form of treatment, 
or the potential hazards and long-term effects of playing with a specific ailment or 
                                                                
94Id.  For one to recover damages in a negligence claim he or she must prove facts that 
give rise to a duty, a failure to conform to the requisite standard of conduct, which actually 
caused injury. RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 32, at § 328.   
95See Mitten, supra note 33, at § 2(a); See also King, supra note 1, at 685-92. 
96See RESTATEMENT 2d, supra note 32, at §§ 282, 328. 
97See generally Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
98See id. 780. 
99See UBERSTINE, supra note 7, at 14 A 14 n.66 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, 189 (5th ed. 1984). 
100See Davis, supra note 1, at 218. 
101Id. at 216. 
102See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783. 
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physical condition, players may also bring claims of fraudulent concealment.103  To 
succeed on a claim of fraudulent concealment, a player must prove that the doctor 
acted with intent to influence a player to rely on false information in making his or 
her decision to continue to play or to return to competition.104  At least one court has 
found that inducing an athlete to change his course of conduct or to alter his 
decision-making process satisfies the necessary intent element.105  In order to recover 
under negligent non-disclosure or fraudulent concealment, an athlete also must prove 
causation, i.e. that had he been properly informed, he would not have adhered to the 
medical treatment or that the advice caused the harm.106 
Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners is the most prominent case imposing 
liability on the team physician, and vicariously on the team itself, based on a claim of 
fraudulent concealment of medical information.107  Charles Krueger was a defensive 
lineman for the Forty Niners for fifteen years.108  Krueger missed very few games 
during his career and was respected around the league for playing through the pain 
associated with numerous injuries.109  In 1963, Krueger ruptured the medial collateral 
ligament in his left knee and underwent surgery, after which the Forty Niners team 
doctor declared Krueger’s knee to have undergone a “good repair.”110  Krueger’s 
knee subsequently swelled and caused him severe pain during the 1964 season.111  As 
treatment for this condition, team physician, Dr. Lloyd Taylor, administered 
powerful steroid injections of Novocain and cortisone.112  These steroid injections 
were known to cause degenerative abnormalities resulting in cartilage 
decomposition.113  Krueger testified that he had received about fifty injections during 
that year and then fourteen to twenty injections each year from 1964 to 1973.114   
                                                                
103See, e.g., Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579; Hendy, 819 P.2d at 1; Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 
163; Sherwin, 752 F. Supp. at 1172.  
104See Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 at 582-83, citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1709, 1710 
(“[o]ne who willfully deceives another with the intent to induce him to alter his position to his 
injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.”  The court further 
recognized that for the intentional concealment of a material fact to be actionable as fraud, 
there must exist a fiduciary relationship.  According to the court, the doctor-patient 
relationship between Krueger and the physician satisfied this requirement.). 
105Id.  
106Id. at 584-85. 
107See generally id. at 579. 
108Id. at 580. 
109Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 580. 
110Id. at 580-81. 
111Id. at 581. 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 581. 
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During the 1970 season, Krueger felt a piece of his knee break off during a game 
and could feel it inside his leg.115  The team physician gave Krueger a pain numbing 
shot and advised him to return to play.116  In 1971, Krueger underwent another 
surgery to remove loose bodies in his knee after an x-ray revealed degenerative, 
post-traumatic changes in his knee joint.117  None of the doctors treating Krueger 
informed him of the medically known risks and consequences associated with 
injections of steroids,118 nor did they notify him of the presence of loose bodies in his 
knee.119  Krueger testified that had he known of the dangers associated with receiving 
the injections, or the consequences of continuing to play professional football in his 
condition, he would have rejected the treatment and retired.120  Krueger is now 
permanently disabled.121  He suffers from traumatic arthritis and a crippling 
degenerative condition in his left knee that prohibits him from standing for 
prolonged periods of time or walking up and down stairs without severe pain.122  
The Krueger court found that Dr. Lloyd Taylor breached his duty when he failed 
to disclose information necessary for Krueger to furnish his informed consent.123  
Furthermore, the court concluded that the physician’s actions constituted fraud.124  
The court found that an actual intent to deceive was not required.  The intent to 
induce an athlete to adopt or abandon a course of action, which ultimately proved to 
be harmful, was sufficient for liability under a fraudulent concealment claim.125  In 
accepting Krueger’s allegations of intent, the court considered the obvious interest 
that the Forty Niners had in prolonging Krueger’s career.126  The Krueger litigation 
stunned the professional sports industry127 and seemed to open the doors of recovery 
for the injured professional athlete.  However, few athletes have found similar 
success with claims against team physicians and professional franchises.128   





119Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 581. 
120Id.  
121Id. at 582. 
122Id.  
123Id. at 584. 
124Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 584. 
125Id. at 584 (citing Peskin v. Spuires, 319 P.2d 405 (Cal. App. Ct. 1957)). 
126Id. 
127See Jennifer Lynn Woodlief, Fraudulent Concealment of Medical Information in 
Professional Football, 9 SPG ENT & SPORTS LAW. 3, 6-7 (1991). 
128See, e.g., Martin v. Casagrande, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (App. Div. 1990); Depiano v. 
Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 F. Supp. 116 (W.D. Pa. 1987). 
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IV.  CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS GOVERNING 
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETIC CONTRACTS 
In most professional sports, players’ unions bargain with team owners on behalf 
of all of the players regarding the terms of standard player employment contracts.129  
The resulting agreement between the representative entity and the team owners is the 
Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter CBA).130  This Agreement dictates the 
terms and conditions of standard player contracts.131  Although some terms are 
negotiable, the CBA expresses the minimum obligations and duties within 
professional athletic employment agreements.132  CBAs also address the procedure 
for resolving disputes.133  The typical CBA entitles the athlete to team-provided or 
paid-for medical care.134  Thus, standard player contracts typically allow the team to 
appoint a physician who ultimately makes final medical decisions.135  
A.  Standard vs. Guaranteed Player Contracts 
Professional sports employment contracts fall into two general categories.  Under 
the standard contract, a club may terminate a player’s employment if the player is 
unable to perform.136  Under a standard contract, a player injured in the course and 
scope of his employment will receive full compensation during his disability until 
the end of the season.137  The injured player is also entitled to reasonable medical 
costs, usually for a specified time period from the date of initial treatment.138 
Under a guaranteed contract, the team usually agrees to pay the injured player a 
full salary despite any injuries that the athlete might incur during the scope and 
course of his employment for the entire agreed-upon term, as well as compensation 
for reasonable medical costs.139  This type of agreement ensures the player’s salary 
for the agreed-upon time period, even if the athlete fails to exhibit skills sufficient to 
qualify him as a member of that particular team.140 
The terms of standard and guaranteed contracts provide compensation for injury 
without regard to the manner in which the athlete was injured.141  There is no 
                                                                




133See Herbert, supra note 53, at 246-47. 
134Id. 




139Id. at 247-48. 
140See Herbert, supra note 53, at 247. 
141See WEISTART & LOWELL, supra note 29, at 829-30. 
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differentiation between accidental, negligent, or intentional injuries.142  Thus, the 
compensation an injured athlete receives is measured the same for an athlete injured 
in an accidental collision in practice and an athlete injured by negligent medical 
treatment.143  These agreements provide no compensation for any tortious acts 
committed against the athlete by team physicians or by team personnel.  This lack of 
accountability and personal responsibility creates disincentives for team doctors 
and/or team personnel to administer prudent care founded on athletes’ best interests.  
B.  Federal Preemption of State Law Tort Claims  
The Supreme Court has authorized federal courts to fashion a uniform body of 
federal law governing CBAs.144  Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act (hereinafter LMRA) controls procedural and substantive adjudication of litigious 
conflicts between employers and labor unions.145  The Supreme Court has declared 
§ 301 of the LMRA to preempt state law.146  Claims substantially dependent upon the 
interpretation of provisions within the agreement between parties to a labor contract 
(CBA) are therefore governed exclusively by federal law.147  Courts hold this 
preemptive effect to extend to all suits wherein the terms of the CBA, including 
those suits alleging tort claims.148   
The terms in professional player contracts address injury and medical care 
provision.  Any professional athlete’s claim against his team that is substantially 
related to the contractual provisions of the CBA is governed by federal law.  Once a 
court determines that a claim or dispute is governed by LMRA § 301, the court 
defers to any arbitration provisions contained within the labor agreement (CBA).149  
No court will reach the merits of any claim which, on its face, appears to be 
governed by an applicable arbitration provision.150  Thus, athletes are often excluded 
from seeking redress through litigation for injuries associated with negligent medical 
care. 
Professional sports CBAs contain arbitration clauses that establish exclusive 
procedures for resolving specific grievances arising out of particular contract 
provisions.151  As a consequence, grievances arising out of contractual provisions 
                                                                
142Id. 
143Id.  
144Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). 
145Id. at 220. 
146Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc., 87 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 1996). 
147Id. 
148Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 219-20.  
149See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 830-31.  See also Sherwin, 752 F. Supp. at 1172; 
Smith, 87 F. 3d at 717. 
150See BERRY & WONG, supra note 2, at 249, citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
151See Herbert, supra note 53, at 246-49, citing UNIFORM PLAYER’S CONTRACT, THE 
NATIONAL LEAGUE OF PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL CLUBS ¶ 7(b)(1) (contract referred to here is 
representative of all major sports league employment agreements). 
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addressing medical treatment effectively become breach of contract claims.  The 
resulting award provides a player only with contractual damages.  Professional 
athletes cannot recover for physical and mental pain and suffering, physical 
disfigurement, physical impairment, or loss of earning capacity through arbitration 
proceedings.152  Furthermore, the possibility of punitive damages to deter abusive 
practices and customs within professional sports are unavailable.  Arbitration as an 
exclusive remedy for athletes who are physically injured by negligent medical 
treatment or fraudulent diagnosis, attaches no personal liability to professional sports 
teams or sports physicians.  Therefore, it fails to create an incentive for doctors to 
employ precautious medical treatments or to adhere to a prudent standard of care. 
In Smith v. Houston Oilers, Inc., two football players employed under one-year 
standard contracts were injured during the pre-season.153  The NFL prohibits 
terminating a player’s contract if the player is recovering from a football-related 
injury.154  Therefore, the players were offered settlements to leave the team 
voluntarily.155  Neither accepted the team’s offers.  In order to coerce them into 
accepting these offers and leaving the team, the Oilers allegedly forced the athletes 
through an abusive rehabilitation program.156  This program ostensibly consisted of a 
reduction in actual rehabilitative treatment, the imposition of strenuous exercise far 
exceeding earlier demands, sleep deprivation resulting from workouts beginning at 
four in the morning and some ending at eleven at night, and intentional confusion of 
workout schedules.157 
The strenuous program caused one of the players to collapse from exhaustion 
during a 4:00 A.M. workout session.158  Together, the players sued the Houston 
Oilers and the team trainer for injuries sustained as a result of the rehabilitation 
program.159  Sherman and Tracy Smith brought claims of coercion, duress, assault 
and battery, extortion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.160 
The Oilers maintained that the claims were preempted by federal law pursuant to 
LMRA § 301, and, therefore, must be resolved in compliance with the arbitration 
provisions of the CBA governing NFL employment contracts.161  In response, the 
players argued that resolution of their claims did not require interpretation of the 
terms of the CBA, and, alternatively, that the Oilers’ conduct was sufficiently 
outrageous to override LMRA § 301 preemption.162  
                                                                
152See Herbert, supra note 53, at 249, citing Lingle, 486 U.S. at 399. 
153Smith, 87 F.3d at 718.  
154Id. 
155Id. 
156Id. at 718-719. 
157Id. at 718.  All the while team staff threatened to blackball Sherman and Tracy from 
employment with other NFL teams   
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In reaching a verdict for the Oilers, the district court determined that the claims 
ultimately amounted to an underlying labor dispute over the termination pay 
settlement offer.163  According to the court, this dispute was indistinguishable and 
inseparable from the Oilers’ conduct in forcing the players to choose between the 
terms of the offer and participation in the rehabilitation program.164  LMRA § 301 
preempted the claims because their resolution depended upon an analysis of the 
governing CBA, specifically, a clause authorizing NFL franchises to require 
participation in rehabilitation programs.165  As a result, the players’ only recourse was 
arbitration as per the CBA.166 
In pursuing an appeal, the players argued that the Oilers’ conduct was so 
outrageous that the CBA could not be interpreted to have condoned it, and therefore, 
no interpretation of any CBA provision was necessary to resolve the claims.167  In 
addressing this argument, the appellate court conceded that where the actions 
involved consisted entirely of an employer’s physical battery of an employee, there 
is no need for the interpretation of any labor agreement.  It is generally understood 
that the CBA could not have condoned the intentional tort.168  Therefore, 
adjudication of the battery claim did not depend upon the meaning of any terms 
included in the CBA.169  However, the Court further stated that, in order for a 
physical battery to be independent of the CBA, there must be a direct physical act of 
violence committed against the claimant.170  Without an allegation of a direct 
physical battery, the court was unwilling to apply the above-mentioned battery 
exclusion.171  The court expressly suggested that the players themselves were 
responsible for the mistreatment because they “wanted to remain with a team that 
didn’t want them” and that the two men could have chosen not to participate.172  
Ultimately, the court translated the player’s tort claims into contractual disputes over 
the relative bargaining power of the team, resulting in unreasonable negotiations 
                                                                
163Smith, 87 F.3d at 720-21. 
164Id. at 721 (The court stated, “Another way of stating this is that we have here a case 
involving contract rights, not condoned violence…  Whether the Oilers had a legal right to 
require the players either to endure the workouts or quit is therefore a question of contract 
law.”  This type of reasoning transforms a claim scrutinizing potentially tortuous, or at least 
negligent conduct into one which will only measure the conformity of the conduct to a 
contract term.). 
165See generally id. at 720-21. 
166Id. at 721. 
167Id. at 717, 719. 
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concerning the termination offer.173 Characterized in this way, the court deferred the 
dispute over the players’ contractual rights to the prescribed arbitration methods.174 
In denying Tracy and Sherman Smith an avenue for compensation for their 
injuries other than binding arbitration, the Smith court defined and characterized the 
players’ claims as contractual in nature.  The court in Smith, failed to separate the 
issues, and arguably blurred them into one.  Whether the Oilers could require their 
players to undergo the rehabilitation program may have required interpretation of the 
CBA.  The players, however, were suing for the injuries sustained as a result of 
participation in the program.  They sought damages for the intentional torts the team 
committed against them, unrelated to their respective employment contracts.   
Even though the court in Smith acknowledged physical battery claims as 
exceptions to federal preemption, it refused to apply this exception to the facts 
because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the team committed a direct act of physical 
violence against them.175  However, American jurisprudence has long recognized that 
no direct physical act or touching is required to recover under a claim of battery.176  
The Smith court’s analysis effectively shields professional sports teams from tort 
liability for abuse of their athletes as long as the team or team employees never 
directly hit or otherwise batter the athlete. 
CBAs governing professional athlete employment agreements shield team 
franchises from personal liability or sanction for player mistreatment by limiting 
athletes’ grievance procedures to arbitration.  Consequently, professional teams are 
not threatened with potentially large damage awards to discourage negligent and/or 
reckless care of athletes.  Furthermore, arbitration as an exclusive remedy denies 
injured athletes adequate compensation.  Arbitration awards are effectively 
nonreviewable by courts.177 
V.  WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
A.  Underlying Policy/Typical Statute 
Workers’ compensation laws further impede athletes from obtaining adequate 
compensation for injuries resulting from a team physician’s negligence or fraud.  
State workers’ compensation laws provide cash-wage benefits and medical care to 
victims of work-related injuries.178  The underlying premise of workers’ 
compensation legislation is the social desirability of giving employees a definite and 
                                                                
173Smith, 87 F.3d at 720. 
174Id. at 721. 
175Id. at 720. 
176See Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967) (citing Morgan 
v. Lyacomo, 1 So. 2d 510 (Miss. 1941) where the court declared that it is not necessary to 
touch a plaintiff’s body or clothing or knock or snatch anything from a plaintiff’s hand or 
touch anything connected with his or her body to constitute an assault and battery, so long as 
the conduct was offensive). 
177See 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (West 2002).  The Federal Arbitration Act removes court 
jurisdiction over disputes wherein the parties have contractually agreed to dispute resolution 
via arbitration proceedings. 
178See ARTHUR LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW (2000). 
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efficient means of compensation for injuries suffered in the course of employment, 
without the necessity of proving fault.179  Injured employees give up the right to sue 
their employers for full compensation in return for definite, modest recovery without 
litigation, while employers protect themselves from large damage awards in 
exchange for liability without determination of fault.180 
Workers’ compensation laws only provide coverage to persons having the status 
of employee and expressly exclude independent contractors.181  Most state statutes 
offer benefits to the injured employee of between one half and two thirds of the 
employee’s average weekly wage, and impose maximum and minimum limits.182  
These benefit awards are limited to disabilities.  Workers’ compensation does not 
offer benefits for physical or mental pain and suffering.183  Consequently, workers’ 
compensation does not restore the claimant to the position he or she was in prior to 
the work-related injury.  The amount of compensation awarded is generally not much 
higher than is necessary to prevent the worker from insolvency.184 
B.  Classification as Employee or Independent Contractor 
The nature of a team physician’s relationship with a sports franchise determines 
whether an athlete’s injury caused by a team doctor will be covered under workers’ 
compensation statutes.  When employee athletes are injured during the course of 
their employment for the team, and their claims are against team physicians 
considered to be employees of the team, workers’ compensation may be the athletes’ 
exclusive remedy.185  This situation prohibits injured athletes from recovering 
damages associated with their injuries, and instead, provides them with a percentage 
of their wages because of their inability to work.186  As a result, athletes go 
uncompensated for the tort committed against them and negligent and fraudulent 
medical care providers escape liability.  The classification of doctors as independent 
contractors however, allows injured athletes to collect damages above and beyond 
the benefits available under workers’ compensation statutes.  When athletes are able 
to recover against an independent contractor team physician directly, they can pursue 
compensation not only for loss of wages, but also for physical and mental pain and 
suffering.  Furthermore, the liability associated with this latter scenario attaches at 
the source of the culpable conduct and allows for potential punitive damage awards. 
The Restatement (Second) of Agency §220 sets forth factors that courts use to 
distinguish employees from independent contractors.  These factors include: (1) the 
extent of control that the master exercises over the details of the work in question; 
                                                                
179Id. 
180Id. 
181Id. § 1.01, at 1-3. 
182Id. 
183See LARSON, supra note 178, at § 1.03[4], 1-10. 
184Id. at § 1.03[5], at 1-10. 
185See, e.g., Hendy v. Losse, 819 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1991); Martin, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (both cases 
held that workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy for injured professional athletes). 
186See LARSON, supra note 178, at § 1.03[4], 1-10. 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
528 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:507 
(2) whether the one employed is in a distinct occupation; (3) whether the work 
involved is such that it normally involves supervision; (4) the skill required to 
perform the work; (5) who supplies the necessary instrumentalities; (6) the length 
and time for which the person is employed; (7) the method of payment; and (8) the 
intent of the parties.187  In addition to the Restatement factors, courts consider an 
employer’s tax filings as well as other documents associated with employment.188  
These documents can be relevant to the determination whether an employer-
employee situation exists. 
In Bryant v. Fox, former Chicago Bears players brought an action against the 
team’s physician for medical malpractice.189  In an attempt to circumvent workers’ 
compensation laws as an exclusive remedy, the plaintiffs argued that the doctor was 
an independent contractor.190  The Bryant court determined that the physician was 
not an employee of the Chicago Bears, and thus, the players’ relief was not limited to 
the benefits available under the Illinois’ workers’ compensation statute.191  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon evidence that the team paid the doctor 
on a case-by-case basis, that the team did not offer many of their employee benefits 
to the physician, that the team did not provide the doctor with a W-2 tax form, nor 
did they deduct social security from his pay, and most importantly, the team did not 
exercise the requisite level of control over the physician’s duties.192  Consequently, 
the players were able to bring a tort action against the physician. 
Recent litigation, however, suggests that professional teams, sports physicians, 
and team physician insurance providers have learned from cases like Bryant v. 
Fox.193  Many insurance providers now require insured team physicians to sign 
detailed employment contracts with professional teams.194  These employment 
contracts expressly declare the physician an employee.  The terms’ structure creates 
an employer-employee situation.  Insurers are obviously cognizant of the immunity a 
team doctor enjoys under state workers’ compensation laws when he or she is 
classified as an employee, as opposed to an independent contractor.  The case of 
Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks reflects this trend.195  
                                                                
187See RESTATMENT OF AGENCY § 220 (2)(a)-(j) (1958). 
188See Bryant v. Fox, 515 N.E.2d 775 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (where the court considered the 
filing of W-2 tax forms in determining a doctor’s employment status). 
189Id. at 775-76. 
190Id. 
191Id. at 778. 
192Id. 
193See, e.g., Daniels v. Seattle Seahawks, 968 P.2d 883 (Wash. App. Ct. 1998) 968 P.2d 
883 (where a team physician’s insurance provider required the doctor to sign an employment 
contract with a professional team to remain eligible for malpractice coverage.  No doubt the 
insurance company understood the workers’ compensation immunity associated with injuries 
resulting from the negligence of a co-employee.). 
194Id. at 885. 
195Id. at 883-88. 
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In Daniels, a former Seahawk player claimed that the team’s physician was 
amenable to a medical malpractice suit because of his independent contractor 
status.196  Daniels, a professional football player, injured himself while playing for 
the Seattle Seahawks.197  The team doctor diagnosed his injury as a groin pull and 
advised him to return to play.198  Daniels was unable to play and never recovered.199  
Daniels ultimately found out that he had, in fact, fractured his rectus femoris and that 
the team physician had misdiagnosed his injury.200  
Although the physician originally provided medical care under a fee-for-service 
arrangement with the team, later, his insurance carrier required that he sign a detailed 
employment contract.201  Pursuant to this contract, the team paid the physician an 
annual salary.  His delineated obligations to the Seahawks consisted of about sixty 
percent of his medical practice.202  Under the terms of the employment agreement, 
the team handled the doctor’s relevant tax filings and paid workers’ compensation 
benefits to the state.203  However, the physician received no health insurance, sick 
leave, eligibility in the team’s 401(K), life insurance, or vacation pay, all of which 
were available to Seattle Seahawk employees.204  
Although the physician retained sole responsibility for medical decisions, the 
court determined that the employment contract clearly controlled the doctor’s 
physical conduct in performing his contractual duties for the team.205  Consequently, 
co-employee immunity under Washington’s workers’ compensation statute barred 
the athlete’s suit against the doctor.206  As a result, the court never considered the 
merits of Daniels’ malpractice claim.207  At the insistence of the doctor’s personal 
insurance provider, the Seahawks and the physician successfully drafted an 
employment agreement, under which athlete employees were effectively barred from 
bringing lawsuits against the doctor. 
Even though a few states have enacted specific legislation excluding or limiting 
the coverage for professional athletes,208 the statutory application by the Daniels 
                                                                
196Id. at 884. 
197Id. 
198Daniels, 968 P.2d at 884. 
199Id. 
200Id. 
201Id. at 885. 
202Id. 
203Daniels, 968 P.2d at 885. 
204Id. 
205Id. at 883, 888 n.4. 
206Id. at 887-88. 
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208See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.09 (WEST 2001), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152 §1 
(Law. Co-op. 1993), MO. ANN. STAT. ch. § 270 (Vernon 1991), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 (2001) 
§ 22, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.095, (WEST 2001) and WASH. LAWS §51.08.013 all of which 
exclude professional athletes from workers’ compensation legislation [Hereinafter Statutes]. 
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court represents the majority view in states that have not specifically addressed 
professional athletes in their workers’ compensation statutes.209  Under most workers’ 
compensation laws, team physicians can effectively protect themselves from players’ 
negligence claims by crafting an employment arrangement in which the professional 
athlete and team physician are co-employees. 
Ultimately a team physician is employed for the medical expertise he or she 
possesses.  The typical employment agreement with a professional sports team 
expressly states the autonomous nature of the physician’s medical decisions.210  In 
spite of this fact, courts continue to hold that professional teams, as employers, 
maintain the requisite control over a team physician’s duties to qualify him or her as 
an employee.211  For example, the Daniels court stated that even though, “Dr. Auld 
[the team physician] is solely responsible for exercising his independent medical 
judgment.  …[w]e decline to carve out an exception of this test for physicians merely 
because they retain control over their professional judgment.”212  The immunity that 
team physicians can enjoy under workers’ compensation systems reduces the 
incentive for them to treat athletes with the utmost care, and contemporaneously 
reduces the compensation available to injured athletes. 
C.  Intentional Tort Exception 
Some states exclude intentional tort claims from workers’ compensation 
coverage.213  For example, in Krueger, the court, applying California State law, 
exempted.214 Kreuger’s action for fraud and deceit from workers’ compensation 
coverage.215  The state court held that the physician’s intentional concealment of 
medical information amounted to fraud because of the fiduciary nature of the doctor-
athlete relationship.216  The Krueger case applied a very specific state law217 and 
appears to stand alone in regard to its probative outcome.  In fact, subsequent 
athletes within the same state have attempted to apply the section relied upon by the 
Krueger court without success.218 
                                                                
209See Statutes, supra note 208 (these statutes are the only state laws currently accounting 
for professional athletes). 
210See, e.g., Daniels, 968 P.2d at 885.  The employment contract in this case, while 
providing for a relationship between team and physician whereby team retained significant 
control over the physician’s duties, expressly stated that the doctor would be solely 
responsible for exercising his independent medical judgment.  See also Russell, supra note 43, 
at 307. 
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212Daniels, 968 P.2d at 888 n.4. 
213See Statutes, supra note 208. 
214See Kreuger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 579. 
215Id. 
216Id. at 582-83. 
217CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1709, 1710 (West 1987).   
218See Hendy, 819 P.2d at 1. 
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In states that recognize an intentional tort exception to workers’ compensation 
statutes, the exception appears to be extremely narrow.219  In DePiano v. Montreal 
Baseball Club, Ltd., a minor league baseball player sued his former team alleging 
intentional injury as an exception to the exclusivity of New York’s workers’ 
compensation remedies.220  The player contended that the team forced him to 
continue to play with a known injury and, as a result, intentionally injured him.221  
Applying New York law, the Pennsylvania District Court commented on the difficult 
burden of proof associated with the exception that the plaintiff sought.222 
Citing New York precedent, the DePiano court held that in order to qualify under 
the intentional injury exception to workers’ compensation coverage, the defendant 
must have engaged in the challenged conduct with a distinct desire to bring about the 
specific consequences of the act.223  Accordingly, mere knowledge, along with an 
appreciation of the risk of injury, is not equivalent to intent to cause the injury, and 
therefore insufficient for qualification under the exception.224  The court found no 
evidence that the defendant intended to cause injury and further declared that no 
amount of negligence would suffice to meet the requisite burden.225  In fact, the court 
relied on the fact that the team was short outfielders to prove that the team was 
motivated by a desire to keep their players healthy and available for competition.226 
In Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc. and Martin v. Casagrande, 
professional athletes made similar claims arguing that they fell within the intentional 
tort exception to workers’ compensation statutes.227  The courts denied them relief 
under tort law because they had already accepted workers’ compensation benefits.228  
In both cases, the athletes had accepted workers’ compensation benefits prior to 
filing suit for damages.229  The Martin court expressly stated that, where an employee 
has received workers’ compensation benefits, his right to sue his employer no longer 
                                                                
219See, e.g., DePiano v. Montreal Baseball Club, Ltd., 663 F. Supp. 116, 117 (W.D. Pa. 
1987); Martin v. Casagrande, 559 N.Y.S.2d 68 (N.Y. App. 1990).  See also Gambrell, 562 
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football player against his former team and team physician merged with the actual physical 
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220DePiano, 663 F. Supp. at 116. 
221Id. at 117. 
222The court stated that in order to succeed under the exception, “[T]he claimant employee 
must prove an intentional or deliberate act by the employer directed at causing harm to that 
particular employee.”  Id. 
223Id. 
224Id.  (The court goes on to say that the fact that an injury is substantially certain to occur 
is not enough to hold an employee liable for an injury to a co-employee in the course of 
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225DePiano, 663 F. Supp. at 116, 117. 
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227Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 163; Martin, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 68.  
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exists and thus, the merits of any subsequent claims are not considered.230  Similarly, 
the Gambrell court recognized that where an injury is determined to be compensable 
under workers’ compensation, any common law suit is subsequently barred.231 
Employment agreements in the professional sports entertainment industry are 
contracts for future performance and differ from typical at-will employment 
relationships.  A professional team has exclusive rights to an athlete under contract 
and the player is prohibited from working for other teams.  Thus, the courts’ narrow 
interpretation of the intentional injury exception has a greater impact on the 
professional athlete’s work environment compared to the at-will employment setting.  
Teams have total control over the nature of medical care an athlete receives.  It is 
usually the team physician’s final decision as to the type and amount of medical 
treatment administered.232  What’s more, injuries are constantly present in the 
professional sports work place.  Even if a team’s immediate intent may be to keep a 
player available for competition, teams and team physicians should not escape 
personal liability for the injuries to athletes that are certain to result. 
D.  Dual Capacity Doctrine 
The dual capacity doctrine is another exception to the exclusivity of workers’ 
compensation statutes.  In its broadest interpretation, this doctrine stands for the 
premise that a co-employee may assume a relationship with another co-employee 
distinct from the one originally established or accepted in the work place 
environment, and any injuries resulting from this unique relationship are not subject 
to coverage by workers’ compensation.233  Although athletes, in suits against 
physicians and sports teams, regularly invoke this doctrine, courts rarely recognize 
its applicability.234   
In Hendy v. Losse, Hendy, a professional football player for the San Diego 
Chargers, sued the team physician alleging medical malpractice for the treatment of a 
knee injury he sustained during the 1986 and 1987 NFL seasons.235  Hendy argued 
that the team doctor negligently caused him permanent injury by advising him to 
continue to play in spite of his injury.236  The physician moved for dismissal of the 
action, arguing that Hendy’s work-related injury was compensable exclusively under 
workers’ compensation.237  In rebuttal, Hendy maintained that the physician was 
acting in a dual capacity when he diagnosed and treated his injury.238  
                                                                
230Martin, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 70. 
231Gambrell, 562 S.W.2d at 168. 
232See Herbert, supra note 53, at 252-53. 
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The court declared that the decisive issue in these types of cases is whether the 
physician was acting within the ordinary scope of his or her employment when he or 
she treated the claimant.239  The court held that the doctor, in treating a player for a 
team that employed him, was acting within the scope of his employment.  Hence, co-
employee immunity barred any recovery other than workers’ compensation 
benefits.240  The court based its decision upon the following rationale, 
[T]he purpose of section 3601 is to make workmen’s compensation the 
exclusive remedy of an injured workman against his employer.  That 
purpose would be defeated if a right of action existed against a fellow 
employee acting in the scope of his employment in such a way that the 
fellow employee’s negligence could be imputed to the employer.241 
VI.  PREVENTING ABUSE AND PROVIDING ADEQUATE COMPENSATION:   
PROPOSED REMEDIES 
The triangular relationship between a professional sports team, a team physician, 
and a professional athlete creates a complex dynamic exposing physicians to 
pressures that may impair their sound medical judgment and facilitate physical abuse 
of professional athletes.  At the same time, the professional sports industry is 
organized to limit, and, in most cases, deny adequate compensation to athletes for 
their injuries, and to protect physicians and teams from liability.  CBAs controlling 
employment agreements within professional sports leagues create substantial 
obstacles to recovery for injured athletes.  Furthermore, the legal standards 
applicable to professional sports physicians are uncertain.  Finally, workers’ 
compensation statutes and co-employee immunity impede legal redress for injuries.  
This section proposes solutions that promote accountability within the industry as 
well as the well-being of professional athletes’ physical health.   
A.  Create a Well-Defined Uniform Standard of Care  
The diverse background of specialists providing medical care to professional 
sports teams prevents uniform definition and classification of the term professional 
team physician.242  As a result, the legal standard of care to which these various 
practitioners are subject to, or should be subject to, is uncertain. 
The need for a uniform standard governing the practice of sports medicine in 
order to provide an incentive to physicians to act reasonably is evident.  Without a 
clear standard for determining the reasonableness of a sports medicine practitioner’s 
conduct, team physicians will continue to make questionable medical decisions and 
recommendations.  As sports popularity has risen,243 so has the number of physicians 
practicing sports medicine.244  Concurrently, the literature and resources available 
                                                                
239Id. at 11. 
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concerning medical care to the athlete has dramatically increased.245  Experts in the 
field, along with the large number of responsible sports medicine practitioners must 
influence the American Medical Association to recognize sports medicine as an 
accredited subspecialty within the general practice of medicine. 
This recognition will provide the court system with the requisite societal 
evidence necessary to create a heightened standard of care.  A written exam or 
fellowship requirement will induce courts to recognize a more specific standard and 
eliminate the lengthy process of evolution through judicial scrutiny alone.  More 
importantly, team physicians will know exactly what is expected of them, resulting 
in the cautious administration of medical care and ultimately, less injury as a result 
of exploitation of the professional athlete.  The incentive to provide the prudent care 
associated with uniform application of a heightened standard of care is imperative. 
Currently, the trend is an accepted practice standard, which requires a sports 
medicine practitioner to provide care in accordance with reasonable expectations of 
physicians in general.246  Another modern standard imposed upon physicians 
practicing sports medicine amounts to a “what should have been done under the 
circumstances” test.247  The evolution of a specific sports medicine standard would 
likely impose liability on such a specialist where none may be attached to the general 
practitioner.  
B.  Prohibit Professional Teams From Providing Medical Care 
As discussed above, the conflicts facing team physicians in the professional 
sports industry to unduly influence a doctor’s autonomous medical discretion.  The 
end result often is inadequate or even fraudulent.  Eliminating the conflicts and 
pressures facing team physicians would allow physicians to provide care in an 
environment where athletes’ best interests govern every medical decision.   
1.  Employment by Players Unions/League 
If professional sports teams did not employ team physicians, team management 
would have less influence over the doctors’ day-to-day decisions.  Some 
commentators argue that league players unions should hire physicians.248  Under this 
proposed solution, the third party paying for the medical treatment is an entity that 
advocates athletes’ best interests.  The result would be a doctor-athlete relationship 
more closely related to the typical doctor-patient relationship, one in which the 
patient’s best interests dictate any proposed treatment.  The independent nature of the 
physician’s employment would reduce the doctor’s susceptibility to pressures from 
team management.   
                                                                
245See Russell, supra note 43, at 300 (giving some examples of available resources such 
as: Am. J. Sp. Med., J. Sp. Med. & Physical Fitness, Physician’s Sp. Med. Science & Sp. Med. 
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interests.  See generally Solares, supra note 43. 
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Team physicians, collectively working for the league or players themselves 
through employment arrangements with the unions, arguably could establish a more 
cohesive unit whereby information could be shared and techniques developed more 
efficiently. 
2.  Well-Defined Employment Arrangements 
A clear and express employment agreement between the professional team and 
physician is a less radical means of potentially eliminating conflicts facing the team 
physician.  The medical doctor is a highly trained professional and should demand 
that employment contracts expressly reflect the autonomous nature of his or her 
position with regards to medical treatment.  Although this solution may be unrealistic 
because professional sports teams can find physicians who are willing to agree to 
less stringent terms, a definite legal standard governing sports medicine, coupled 
with a real threat of liability, may encourage physicians to demand such terms. 
3.  Eliminate Incentive Pressures 
As previously mentioned, team physicians have financial incentives that 
influence their treatment decisions.  Leagues should not allow team physicians to 
participate in bonus systems conditioned upon wins or playoff qualifications.  
League regulations should void contracts that provide for monetary incentives and 
bonuses for team physicians.  Furthermore, a team doctor should not receive a 
championship ring should his or her team attain such a goal.   
Physicians must take it upon themselves to retain professional objectivity and not 
succumb to the surrounding pressures prevalent in professional sports.  Thus, the 
need for professional resources through organizations and associations, as well as 
publications, is obvious. 
C.  Redefine the Relationship Between Healthcare Provider and  
Healthcare Purchaser 
Ultimately, the only way to eliminate the significant conflicts facing team 
physicians is to rearrange the current relationship between the health care provider 
and the purchaser of such care.  The professional team and the athlete employee 
often have different interests.  Eliminating the control teams have over subordinate 
physician employees offers the most effective solution.  Realizing reform will take 
the initiative of players unions and ultimately, professional athletes themselves. 
Prohibiting professional sports organizations from providing athlete medical care 
would additionally help the professional athlete to overcome the restrictions of the 
CBA governing his employment agreement.  In the absence of a contractual term 
providing for team-administered care, claims arising out of negligent medical 
treatment would be independent from the CBA and would not require interpretation 
of any included provisions.  This arrangement would, therefore, allow state tort 
claims, otherwise preempted by federal law, and provide an avenue for adequate 
compensation.  The attendant liability would also contribute to the evolution of an 
accepted legal standard of conduct.  The absence of a uniform body of law 
delineating the legal standards applicable to sports medicine practitioners inhibits 
incentives for team physicians to act according to athletes’ best interests.  
Furthermore, if treating physicians were not employees of teams, state workers’ 
compensation statutes would not bar suits against physicians by way of co-employee 
immunity.  The protection from liability most team physicians currently enjoy would 
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become unavailable.  As a result, athletes would have the opportunity to pursue 
compensation above and beyond workers’ compensation benefits, which are often 
times inadequate for the relatively highly paid professional player.  The imposition 
of liability on the caregiver would encourage better care. 
D.  Amend/Redefine Application of State Workers’ Compensation Laws 
The underlying policy of workers’ compensation has been accepted as a means of 
offering financial security to employees injured on the job.  Within the sports 
entertainment industry, however, workers’ compensation laws shield teams and team 
physicians from tort liability and encourage physical exploitation of athletes.  
Professional sports franchises as employers exercise a much greater level of control 
over athletes than do employers outside the sports entertainment industry.  For 
example, a professional athlete may not change employers unless he is traded, and 
professional teams, unlike other employers, retain total control over the health of the 
athletes.  The workers’ compensation system must recognize the professional 
athlete’s unique working environment, and alter its application accordingly in order 
to protect the athlete’s welfare. 
Professional athletes should be able to bring legal claims against team physicians 
for malpractice regardless of physicians’ status as team employees.  Application of 
the co-employee immunity doctrine in this instance encourages less than competent 
medical treatment because no real threat of liability influences the physician.  An 
injured professional athlete patient should have the right to the same claims against a 
doctor, as does the injured non-athlete patient.  Physicians should ultimately be held 
responsible when their conduct falls below the requisite expected standard.   
Professional athletes should be excluded from state workers’ compensation 
statutes, or alternatively, state statutes should be amended to allow athletes to sue 
team physicians.  Either reform would promote more competent care. In addition, the 
potential threat of vicarious liability would discourage professional teams from 
jeopardizing the health of their players.  Although this result represents a departure 
from the underlying policies associated with workers’ compensation, it should be 
allowed within the professional sports industry to promote the health and safety of 
professional athlete employees because of the unique control sports franchises have 
over employee athletes. 
Alternatively, physicians could be defined as independent contractors for the 
purposes of workers’ compensation laws.  Medical doctors are ultimately employed 
for their independent medical judgment and thus, should be treated as independent 
contractors.  No control should ever be retained over a doctor’s expert medical 
discretion and therefore, the title of independent contractor is appropriate.  Modern 
case law comports with this notion and considers physicians employed by a hospital 
to be independent contractors249.  Defined as such, the co-employee immunity 
doctrine is inapplicable and athletes can hold physicians accountable for negligent 
treatment and fraudulent medical care.   
Although some states exclude professional athletes from their workers’ 
compensation legislation,250 and others, such as California allow tort actions against 
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co-employees who can prove fraud,251 most state statutes contain no such provisions.  
Without an amendment or exception to state workers’ compensation laws accounting 
for the professional athlete, players have little to no protection from a team 
physician’s substandard medical care. 
E.  Athletes and Representatives Become More Involved In Medical Treatment 
The professional athlete can insure proficient medical care despite the influences 
professional teams may have over team doctors.  Any professional athlete’s career 
depends upon the use of his or her body and therefore, athletes should assume a more 
proactive role regarding the medical treatment they receive.  Accordingly, athletes 
should demand full disclosure and attempt to educate themselves on any injury so 
that they can make reasonable decisions regarding their own bodies.  Furthermore, 
athletes should demand second opinions from independent doctors when they feel 
that team physicians are not administering care in accordance with their best interests 
or feel pressured to return to competition before they are ready. 
Although most contracts hold teams responsible for administering medical 
care,252 an athlete and his agent should negotiate the right to a second, independent 
opinion.  Players unions should help professional athletes in establishing this type of 
practice.  For example, had Charles Krueger gotten a second opinion earlier, he 
might not be permanently disabled today; and if Mike Robitaille had done the same, 
he might not have had to endure the pain and suffering he did.  Contractual 
provisions guaranteeing the right to an outside physician would eliminate many of 
the injuries associated with fraudulent concealment situations, and reduce the long-
term abuse many athletes experience. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Professional sports are a powerful attraction in the United States and the industry 
generates substantial amounts of money.  The commodities of this industry are the 
professional players who compete for a living.  The pressure to win leads to the 
compromise of the health and safety of professional athletes.  Team sports’ 
physicians face extreme pressure to clear athletes for competition and often make 
decisions in derogation of sound medical judgment.  The non-acceptance of a 
uniform standard of care applicable to sports physicians exacerbates this 
predicament.  Sports medicine is most definitely a specialty of medicine and should 
be recognized as such by the formation and acceptance of a uniform standard. 
The money side of the sports entertainment industry has recognized that high-
level competition translates into financial success.  Exploitation of professional 
athletes through unreasonable medical treatment currently goes unchecked as a result 
of the governing CBAs and applicable federal law and the immunity afforded teams 
and physicians under state workers’ compensation statutes.  In order to protect 
professional athletes, liability must potentially attach at the level at which the care is 
administered.  Creating a well-defined standard of care applicable to team 
physicians, eliminating pressures facing team doctors, and recognizing the problems 
                                                                
251See CAL. CIVIL CODE §1709 (West 2001) providing that one who willfully deceives 
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associated with the current laws applicable to the sports entertainment industry and 
subsequently amending or reapplying them will result in attaching liability at the 
appropriate level.  Faced with the real threat of money damages, teams and team 
physicians will provide more adequate medical treatment to professional athletes 
which will ultimately result in less exploitation. 
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